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Fitzgerald: Toward Dignity in the Workplace: Miller-Wohl and Beyond

TOWARD DIGNITY IN THE WORKPLACE:
MILLER-WOHL AND BEYOND'
Wendy A. Fitzgerald
The starting point for sex discrimination analysis in Montana
should always be the sweeping "dignity clause" of the 1972 Montana Constitution: "The dignity of the human being is inviolable.
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither
the state, nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate

. . .

on account of ... sex."2 Unique in its reach to pri-

vate as well as state action,3 the clause inextricably binds freedom
from sex discrimination with equality and inviolable human dignity. In the two years following passage of the Montana Constitution, the legislature enacted both remedies for sex discrimination
in employment 4 and special programs for women in employment'
1. Research for this comment benefited greatly from the suggestions of Bari R. Burke,
Associate Professor of Law, University of Montana Law School. The comments of Margery
H. Brown, Professor of Law, University of Montana Law School; Joan Jonkel, J.D.,
University of Montana, 1978; and Thomas P. Huff, Professor of Philosophy and Lecturer in
Law, University of Montana, were also most helpful. Any errors or omissions, however, are
the author's alone.
2. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4. See Comment, The Montana Constitution: Taking New
Rights Seriously, Equal Rights, (PartII), 39 MONT. L. REV. 221, 238-48 (1978) and Comment, Equality for Men and Women, Three Approaches: Frontiero, the Equal Rights
Amendment, and the Montana Equal Dignities Provision, 35 MONT. L. REV. 325 (1974)
(authored by Joan Uda) for valuable discussions of women's rights and the constitution's
equal dignity clause.
3. Taking New Rights Seriously, supra note 2, at 239-40.
4. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303(1)(a) (1987) provides:
(1) It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for: (a) an employer to refuse employment to a person, to bar him from employment, or to discriminate against him in
compensation or in a term, condition, or privilege of employment because of his
...sex when the reasonable demands of the position do not require ... [a] sex
distinction ....
5. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-7-101 to -104 (1987) establishes a detailed affirmative program within the Department of Labor and Industry to promote employment of women in
Montana. Specifically, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-7-103 provides:
The Department of Labor and Industry shall: (1) conduct studies about the
changing employment needs and problems of women in Montana and make recommendations to the governor and the legislature; (2) direct public attention to
critical employment problems confronting women as wives, mothers, homemakers,
and workers; (3) serve as a clearinghouse for information and materials pertinent
to programs and services available to assist and advise women on employment and
related matters; (4) cooperate with governmental departments and agencies primarily involved in curbing job discrimination and in the expansion of employment
rights and opportunities available to the women of this state; (5) conduct periodic
conferences throughout the state to make women more aware of employment opportunities, programs, and services available to them; (6) serve as the central, permanent agency for the coordination and evaluation of employment programs and
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designed to implement the new constitutional mandate.' The Montana Maternity Leave Act 7 was the most far-reaching of the legislative enactments. Though the legislature passed these remedies for
sex discrimination in employment under the Montana Constitution's dignity clause, the Montana Supreme Court has adopted and
followed federal discrimination analysis when reviewing Montana
cases arising under Montana law.8 Federal courts developed that
analysis chiefly9 under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which
prohibits sex discrimination in employment.10 While the legislature
modelled Montana's remedial statute on Title VII," the constitutional authorities for the two acts radically differ.' 2 Moreover, on
the two occasions when the Montana Maternity Leave Act has
faced challenges in Montana courts, the cases have turned on analysis of federal law.' 3 The Montana judiciary and bar have thus not
yet seized the opportunity to develop an analytical framework for
sex discrimination in employment that wholly reflects Montana's
services for women of the state and as a planning agency for the development of
those services; (7) encourage women's organizations and other groups to institute
local self-help activities designed to meet women's employment and related needs;
(8) apply for and receive grants, appropriations, or gifts from any federal, state, or
local agency, private foundation, or individual to carry out the purposes of this
part.
Also originally included in this chapter was the Montana Maternity Leave Act (MMLA),
now codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-310, 311 (1987).
6. By joint resolution in 1973, the legislature instructed an interim subcommittee to
study implementation of the equal dignity clause "to achieve equality of the sexes under the
law." Equality of the Sexes, 43d Mont. Leg., Report of the Subcommittee on Judiciary 1
(1974). (The study is available in the State Library, Helena, Montana.)
7. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-310, -311 (1987); see supra note 65 for text of statutes.
8. Martinez v. Yellowstone Cnty. Welfare Dep't, - Mont ....
626 P.2d 242,
245 (1981).
9. Federal discrimination analysis also has developed from equal protection claims
(e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)) and anomalously from due process claims (e.g.,
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)). In the latter case the court held
due process required individual evaluation before imposing required pregnancy leave in order not to burden the "fundamental freedom" to reproduce. Id. at 639-40.
10. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e provides at section
703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) in relevant part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex .
11. Martinez, __
Mont. at __,
626 P.2d at 245.
12. Congress enacted Title VII under authority of the Commerce Clause of the federal
Constitution. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 659 (2d ed.
1983).
13. Employers argued that federal law preempted the Montana Maternity Leave Act
on two occasions: Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., Mont. __
, 608 P.2d 1047 (1980) (federal labor law did not preempt the MMLA) and
Miller-Wohl v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., - Mont. -, 744 P.2d 871 (1987) (see
infra note 85 for case history) (Title VII did not preempt the MMLA).
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unique constitutional mandate of equality and human dignity.14
The Montana workplace reflects this legal delay. Though Montana
women enjoy constitutional guarantees against employment discrimination far more expansive than other American women, Montana women's experience duplicates the low pay and status of the
15
national female workforce.
Under the federal legal analysis, overt barriers to women's full
participation in employment are now easily recognized and struck
down as unconstitutional or prohibited by statute."6 Title VII gave
federal courts the authority, for example, to invalidate "protectionist" state laws and employer rules specially limiting the number of
hours 7 or years' s women could work. Federal discrimination analysis has proved wholly inadequate, however, in its application to the
subtler problems which pregnancy and family obligations raise in
the employment setting. To what extent employers may or must
accommodate workers' pregnancies or other family obligations remains unsettled under federal law.
Responding to the 1972 constitutional mandate, the Montana
Legislature specifically addressed employment "problems confronting women as wives, mothers, homemakers, and workers."' 9 In
1975 the legislature enacted the Montana Maternity Leave Act
("MMLA") which requires employers to provide "reasonable" unpaid leave for pregnancy and childbirth and to reinstate workers at
the end of the leave.2" In 1981 a Montana employer challenged the
validity of the MMLA in Miller-Wohl v. Commissioner of Labor.2 '
Federal discrimination analysis collided in Miller-Wohl with the
MMLA's initiative in addressing the subtler forms of sex discrimination. After six years of litigation reaching up and down both
state and federal court systems, the Montana Supreme Court has
now spoken the last word on the Miller-Wohl case, and upheld the
14. Previous commentators in these pages have urged such a development. See Comment, Taking New Rights Seriously and Equality for Men and Women, supra note 2.
15. See discussion infra section II of this comment.
16. It is shocking to realize how recently state laws and private employment practices
restricting women's participation in the workforce have prevailed. As recently as 1972, for
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a private employer's enforcement
of a California statute limiting the number of hours female employees could work. Schaeffer
v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972).
17. Id. at 1007.
18. Rosen v. Public Svc. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1973).
19. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-7-103(2) (1987) (enacted in 1973).
20. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-310 (1987); see infra note 65 for text of statute.
21. Mont.
-, 692 P.2d 1243 (1984), vacated and remanded, 107 S.Ct. 919
(1987), original judgment reinstated, - Mont. -, 744 P.2d 871 (1987).
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MMLA 2 The resolution of that controversial case, however, yet
leaves in limbo the development of a Montana legal analysis capable of effecting the constitutional guarantee of equality and inviolable human dignity.
As a background to the Miller-Wohl case, this comment first
examines how federal courts have struggled and failed to fit
childbearing and childrearing into traditional discrimination analysis. An overview of women's status in the national workforce more
than twenty years after enactment of Title VII, and in the Montana workforce more than fifteen years after passage of the state
constitution follows. Third, this comment analyzes the clashing legal approaches presented in the Miller-Wohl case. Finally, by examining Montana's constitutional dignity clause, this comment
suggests a legal analysis of sex discrimination designed to effect
Montana's unique constitutional mandate.

I.

FEDERAL SEX DISCRIMINATION ANALYSIS

In 1950 most American women, including Montana women,
were not employed outside the home.23 Instead, women dominated
the traditionally female realm of the home and family life while
men dominated the traditionally male realm of employment and
public life. 4 Postwar conditions of employment and workplace
rules reflect this historical division of the sexes. Employers could
assume that a worker's wife maintained the home, freeing the
worker from childcare responsibilities. Employers could therefore
demand of workers long workday hours and years of service uninterrupted by childbearing and childrearing responsibilities. The
22. See infra note 85 for the procedural history of the Miller-Wohl case.
23. Mont. Dep't of Labor and Indus., Research and Analysis Bureau, Montana
Women in the 80s (1985). This publication is the most recent study of Montana women's
experience in the workforce. Statistical research for this comment benefited greatly from the
assistance of Tom Cawley, Research Specialist, Montana Department of Labor and Industry
Research and Analysis Bureau.
24. Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of state "protectionist"
laws restricting women's access to the workplace on the premise that women's domain of the
home and men's of the workplace were properly distinct. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 140-41 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) ("The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization . . . indicates the domestic
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood."); Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) (Woman "is so constituted that she will rest upon and
look to [man] for protection; . . . her physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions ... justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the passion
of man."). The analysis in this comment of the traditional division of the female domain of
the workplace drew from Comment, Childbearingand Childrearing:Feminists and Reform,
73 VA. L. REV. 1145, 1150-54 (1987) (authored by John D. Gibson).
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workplace standard, that family obligations not interfere with employment, developed in an era when most men were employed and
most women were not. The workplace standard thus incorporates a
male norm of workers unfettered by childbearing and childrearing
responsibilities.
Between 1950 and 1983, women's participation in both the national and Montana workforce jumped from twenty-five percent of
women employed to more than fifty percent.25 These millions of
new female workers faced a workplace which, if only by virtue of
history, is defined and dominated by the male norm of uninterrupted dedication to employment. Federal discrimination analysis,
however, offers little relief to women whose pregnancies or other
family obligations challenge the workplace standard that family
obligations not interfere with employment. Instead, federal discrimination analysis has focused on the more overt forms of sex
discrimination in employment.
Title VII prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in employment provides the authority for federal sex discrimination
analysis. The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the purpose of
Title VII is to "achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past" to exclude protected classes such as women.26 In federal discrimination analysis,
then, courts will examine whether an employment practice operates as a barrier to women by discriminating on its face.27 If the
employment practice is "facially neutral," courts will next ask
whether the practice results in a "disparate impact" on women as a
class and thus operates as a discriminatory barrier.2 8 Left unquestioned in this analysis is whether the employment practice itself
reflects a historical male norm perpetuating a sex-based division
between family life and employment. When analyzed from this
perspective, federal sex discrimination cases reveal a commitment
to equal opportunity for women only when women are willing or
able to perform in the workplace just as men always have.
A.

Childrearing Obligations

Both nationally and in Montana, as the percentage of em25. Montana Women in the 80s, supra note 23, at iv.
26. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
27. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, 15-25 (1976);
Corbett, Proving and Defending Employment DiscriminationClaims, 47 MONT. L. REV. 217,
219-37 (1986).
28. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 27, at 65-181; Corbett, supra note 27, at 237-
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ployed women has doubled in the past three decades, mothers of
young children comprise the fastest growing segment.29 These new
female workers struggle to balance their traditional childrearing
obligations with their relatively new employment obligations. The
structure of the typical workplace shows little concern for the
needs of working mothers. In Montana, for example, fewer than
two percent of employers provide any kind of child-care assistance.3 0 Fewer than twenty percent of Montana employers offer
flex-time options"1 for workers who must arrange job schedules
around their children's school hours or doct6r's appointments. The
conflict between women's childrearing obligations and employment
has arisen in the federal courts only in the narrow context of employers denying employment to mothers 32 or firing female workers
who marry.33 These cases illustrate a major blind spot in federal
discrimination analysis.
In the 1971 case of Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,34 for
example, the employer refused to hire women with preschool children but regularly hired men with preschool children.35 The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Court agreed that an employee's preschool children
could pose "conflicting family obligations" impairing the employee's job performance. The employer had failed to establish for
summary judgment purposes, however, that such "conflicting family obligations" were more pertinent to a woman's job performance
than to a man's.3 6 In Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc.,37 also decided in 1971, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated
the employer's policy of firing female cabin attendants who married, while retaining married male attendants.3 8 The airline had
based its policy on the "belief that . . . stewardesses' work sched29. Montana Women in the 80s, supra note 23 at 3.
30. Mont. Dep't of Labor and Indus., Research and Analysis Bureau, Montana Fringe
Benefit and Wage Information by Occupational Classification, 1 (1986). This state publication summarizes the results of a Montana employer survey conducted in 1986.
31. Id. at 1. Flex-time arrangements permit employees to decide when they will work
the number of hours their positions require.
32. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
33. Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
34. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 542. Note that in a concurring opinion Justice Marshall said he would not
have permitted lower court consideration of whether family obligations impinged more on
female employees than on male and thus would have strictly construed the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception to Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination. Id. at 545
(Marshall, J., concurring).
37. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
38. Id. at 1199.
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ules were in conflict with the woman's role in married life. ' '13 The

airline argued further that "[I]f there are women who are able to
adjust their family lives to this type of work schedule as readily as
married men, United has discovered no reliable technique of selecting them ...

"40

The Court of Appeals rejected the employer's

argument. The airline, the court said, must indeed develop a criterion other than marriage for selecting female employees if the airline wished to assure employees' family obligations did not conflict
with their employment.
At the time they were decided, Phillips and Sprogis struck
significant blows against policies which on their face discriminated
against women. Federal discrimination analysis bars the assumption that all women employees have conflicting family obligations
such as childrearing. These cases also established, however, the unfortunate precept that employers may lawfully discriminate
against employees who do have conflicting family obligations, the
vast majority of whom are women. By permitting employers to assert conflicting family obligations as a reason for denying employment opportunities to either sex, the Supreme Court perpetuated a
workplace standard based on the male norm that workers are always unfettered by child care responsibilities. Under this malenorm standard, only those female workers without conflicting family obligations may compete equally with men. By meeting the
male norm of not having child care responsibilities, individual
women gain access to the workplace. As long as women bear primary responsibility for child care, however, a policy discriminating
against all those who care for children will discriminate against
women as a class.
The Phillips and Sprogis cases demonstrate how so-called
"facially" neutral policies can actually perpetuate the traditional
division between the woman's domain of the home and the man's
of employment. Federal discrimination analysis assumes that the
male norm of the workplace which brooks no interference from
employees' family obligations is a gender-neutral standard. Were
employment standards truly gender neutral, then equal treatment
of the sexes under such standards would achieve equal employment opportunity. Where employment standards even subtly incorporate traditional male norms of conduct, however, equal treatment of the sexes will inevitably result in inequality.
39.
40.

Id. at 1207 n.23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
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Childbearing Obligations

Federal discrimination analysis fails even to recognize the disparate impact that policies discriminating against employees with
childrearing responsibilities have on women as a class. Employment policies affecting pregnant workers, on the other hand, have
commanded a good deal of recent attention in the federal courts.
Through the 1970s, women challenged such employment policies as
mandatory pregnancy leaves,4 1 loss of employment for pregnancy,4
and exclusion of pregnancy from employee benefit plans.4 3 There
should be no question that employment policies adversely affecting
only pregnant workers have a disparate impact on women as a
class. In a series of hair-splitting opinions,4 4 however, the U.S. Supreme Court justified many of these policies under federal discrimination analysis. As in the cases concerning the obligation of childrearing, the Supreme Court blindly applied the male norm of the
workplace to uphold the exclusion of pregnancy from the
workplace.
In 1973 the Supreme Court decided Geduldig. v. Aiello, 45 a
pregnancy case brought on federal equal protection grounds. California operates a state disability insurance program in which all
California workers, public and private, participate through a flat
payroll tax.' 6 When the Geduldig case arose, the California program paid benefits to workers disabled from work for any reason
except normal pregnancy.4 7 Pregnant workers challenged the state
program for denying them equal protection, but the Supreme
Court disagreed. The policy was facially neutral, the Court said,
and worked no disparate impact on women: "There is no risk from
which men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no
risk from which women are protected and men not.""" According to
41. See, e.g. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
42. See, e.g., SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 27, at 98 (1979 Supp.).
43. See discussion infra, section I(B) of this comment.
44. For incisive analysis of the Supreme Court's treatment of pregnancy, see Kay,
Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 2-8 (1986);
Krieger & Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and
the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE UL. REV. 513, 527-31 (1983); Williams,
Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 335-51 (1984-1985); Comment, Childbearingand Childrearing,
supra note 24, at 1154-58. There is a good deal of scholarship on the problem of childbearing, childrearing, and sex discrimination. This comment has relied on those articles discussing the Miller-Wohl case and the MMLA.
45. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
46. Id. at 487-88.
47. Id. at 490-91.
48. Id. at 496-97.
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this analysis, the program's exclusion of pregnancy was free from
invidious discrimination.49 The court failed to consider, however,
whether this "facially neutral" policy was actually premised on a
male norm for the workplace. The historically dominant group of
workers do not get pregnant and so established the standard of no
coverage for pregnancy. Few female workers can meet this male
standard since almost all women risk pregnancy. The "faciallyneutral" policy identified by the Geduldig Court therefore incorporates a male norm which must work a disparate impact on women
as a class.
Two years later in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,50 the Supreme Court relied on its Geduldig reasoning to decide a Title VII
action." The private employee benefit plan at issue in Gilbert, like
the public one in Geduldig, excluded only pregnancy. The Court
held that the Gilbert plan worked no disparate impact on women
as a class for, as in Geduldig, the Gilbert insurance plan offered at
least as much financial benefit to female workers as to male.52 The
Court further held that the Gilbert plan was also facially neutral
because, "[p]regnancy-related disabilities constitute an additional
risk, unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for this
risk does not destroy the presumed parity of the benefits, accruing
to men and women alike . . .,53
The Gilbert Court's analysis of pregnancy assured that the
traditionally separate home life and work life should not only remain separate but should also remain allocated between the sexes.
As long as women present no "additional" risks or problems to the
workplace they may enjoy equality with men.5 4 The male norm of
the no-pregnancy workplace need not yield, however, to peculiarly
female obligations such as pregnancy. Peculiarly female obligations-by nature pregnancy and by tradition childrearing-must,
under the Gilbert analysis, remain relegated to the home life. The
Gilbert Court seemed to approve this traditional gender-based division of work and family obligations. In reversing the lower court,
the Gilbert court asserted that Title VII did not mandate pregnancy benefits simply because of the sexes' "differing roles in 'the
scheme of human existence.' ,55 Thus women who choose to bear
49.

Id. at 496.

50. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
51.
52.
53.
54.
addition
55.

Id. at 136.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 139 (emphasis in original).
For analysis of the Gilbert Court's characterization of pregnancy as a superfluous
to the male norm of the worker, see Williams, supra note 44, at 345-46.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139, n.17. According to the Gilbert Court's analysis, pregnancy
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and raise children, according to the Gilbert court, assume a role
that is inimical to successful employment. Title VII guarantees
women equality in the workplace only so far as women are willing
or able to perform the traditionally male role of employment just
as men always have. Performing that role means conforming to the
male norm of relinquishing any family obligations conflicting with
employment.
In 1978 and in reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in
Gilbert,56 Congress amended Title VII with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). 7 The PDA expanded Title VII's express
definitions of prohibited sex discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.58 The PDA assures that courts may
not again, as in Gilbert, hold that employee benefit plans excluding
pregnancy are facially neutral. While the PDA incorporates pregnancy into federal sex discrimination analysis, the analysis remains
superficial. The PDA prohibits the exclusion of pregnant workers
from existing health insurance orl leave benefit plans, but it does
not mandate that employers provide these benefits unless they already provide them to nonpregnant workers.5 ' Thus under the
PDA, pregnancy remains an "additional risk" that women face and
men do not in all workplaces where employers fail to provide leave
or insurance coverage for any disability. The male norm of uninterrupted dedication to work remains integral to the structure of the
national workplace. Female workers with childbearing and childrearing obligations that interfere with employment find no support in federal sex discrimination analysis for their demands for
equality in the workplace.
II.

THE FAILURE OF FEDERAL DISCRIMINATION ANALYSIS

In the 1970s, despite the setbacks of Geduldig and Gilbert,
federal discrimination analysis succeeded in eradicating many of
the overt barriers women faced in entering the workforce. Title VII
disability benefits would result in greater insurance benefits for women than for men.
56. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 691 (1987).
57. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1987).
58. The PDA defined pregnancy as an impermissible ground for discrimination under
Title VII, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), supra note 10. The PDA provides in § 701, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) that:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include ... because of or on
the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the
same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work . . ..
59. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 693.
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legally guarantees that women without childbearing or childrearing
responsibilities can compete with men in the workplace. These advances have left largely intact, though, a workplace still premised
on a male norm. As the Sprogis and Phillips cases demonstrate,
federal discrimination analysis permits employers to favor workers
who can remain on the job for long uninterrupted hours and in the
competition for promotion for many uninterrupted years. The very
structure of the workplace, therefore, meets the needs only of the
male-norm worker unencumbered by childbearing and childrearing
responsibilities.
The workplace incorporation of a male norm was not so compelling an issue in the first decade after Title VII's passage when
most women had the option to depend on a family member for
support. In 1972, the same year Montanans ratified the new state
constitution, women's rights activists proposed the federal Equal
Rights Amendment. Their first concern properly was to secure for
women fundamental constitutional rights and, in employment, the
opportunity to work at all.eo Before two-income families became
the rule instead of the exception, federal discrimination law sought
to preserve for women the voluntary choice to stay at home in the
traditionally-female realm or to enter the traditionally-male realm
of the workplace on its own terms. 1
In Montana too, legislators framed employment equality issues as a matter of women's voluntary choice to enter the
workforce. In 1974 when recommending enactment of laws drafted
to implement Montana's 1972 constitutional dignity clause,6 2 the
Subcommittee on the Judiciary emphasized that "throughout the
subcommittee proceedings, the legislators responded to the doubts
and fears of many citizens by drafting legislation specifically protecting the rights of individuals who wish to assume traditional
60. See, e.g., Comment, Taking New Rights Seriously and Equality for Men and
Women, supra note 2, and Ginsburg, The Equal Rights Amendment Is the Way, 1 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 19 (1978) for constitutional analysis of women's rights.
61. The ERA and other federal discrimination law did not necessarily question the
sex-based distinction between home and workplace or even many assumptions about the
differing roles of the sexes in society. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, counsel to the ACLU Women's
Rights Project and leading advocate of the ERA noted:
The ERA is not a "unisex" amendment. It does not stamp man and woman as one
...;it does not label them the same; it does not require similarity in result, parity
or proportional representation. It simply prohibits government from allocating
rights, responsibilities or opportunities among individuals solely on the basis of
sex.
Ginsburg, supra note 60, at 21.
62. Equality of the Sexes, supra note 6, at 1.
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roles in family and society."63 The subcommittee left no doubt,
moreover, that the individual rights so protected were Montana
women's to be homemakers. Though the subcommittee recommended redrafting Montana's support laws to provide that wives
must also support their husbands, the subcommittee said "support
must include the nonmonetary support provided by a spouse as
homemaker. The subcommittee intends this provision to effectively neutralize the fear that eliminating sexual distinctions from
support laws would weaken the family and force the wife to work
outside the home."" The Montana Legislature thus envisioned
Montana women's equal participation in the workforce as an exercise of personal choice, not economic necessity.
Included in the package of new laws the Subcommittee recommended was the Montana Maternity Leave Act (MMLA) prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.15 This
provision guaranteed for Montana women remedies against pregnancy discrimination three years before the passage of the PDA
offered such remedies to all other American women. The MMLA's
pregnancy leave and reinstatement provision," moreover, was an
unprecedented subversion of the no-pregnancy male norm of the
workplace. For the first time, an anti-discrimination measure
forced the workplace to accommodate the exclusively female risk
of pregnancy. Nowhere did the legislature express the intent, however, that the male-norm structure of the workplace ought fundamentally to change in order to integrate childbearing and childrearing women. In this respect, and as the subcommittee
avowed,6 7 the legislature preserved the traditional gender-based di63. Id. at 3.
64. Id. at 6.
65. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-310 (1987) provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer or his agent to: (1) terminate a woman's employment because of her pregnancy; (2) refuse to grant the employee a reasonable
leave of absence for such pregnancy; (3) deny to the employee who is disabled as a
result of pregnancy any compensation to which she is entitled as a result of the
accumulation of disability or leave benefits accrued pursuant to plans maintained
by her employer, provided that the employer may require disability as a result of
pregnancy to be verified by medical certification that the employee is not able to
perform her employment duties; or (4) require that an employee take a mandatory
maternity leave for an unreasonable length of time.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-311 (1987) provides:
Upon signifying her intent to return at the end of her leave of absence, such employee shall be reinstated to her original job or to an equivalent position with
equivalent pay and accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits, and other
service credits unless, in the case of a private employer, the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so.
66. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-310(2) to -311 (1987).
67. See supra note 63 and accompanying text for subcommittee's intent.
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vision between care for children at home and financial support of
the family in employment.
Even as legislators sought to preserve women's option of assuming the traditional homemaker's role, dramatic changes in the
economy effectively eliminated that option. Women's participation
in the workforce has increased dramatically in the past ten years,
and predictions are that ninety percent of today's women will work
outside the home. 8 Mothers of young children are the fastest
growing segment of female workers, though previously most had
exercised the option to stay at home."' Pressing financial need
prompted most of the influx of women into the workforce.
Women's contribution to a two-parent family's income often saves
the family from poverty, particularly where, as in Montana, so
many men work seasonally.7 0 For single mothers, employment does
not even prevent poverty. By 1983, women headed up sixteen percent of all U.S. families; seventy-five percent of single mothers
with minor children worked; and yet a full third of these families
lived below the poverty line.7 1 Montana single-mothers' experience
again mirrors these national statistics. 2 Women's ability to participate fully in the workforce thus has been transformed in a little
over a decade from an issue of personal choice to an issue of economic necessity.
Gone are the days, then, when the homemaker could free the
breadwinner to compete in the workforce without interruption for
family obligations.7 3 If men in fact shared child care responsibilities equally with women, then the male norm of an uninterrupted
career would adversely affect the sexes equally. The preservation
of the male norm of uninterrupted work in federal discrimination
analysis has instead resulted in a workplace segregated along gender lines. 4 One workforce, largely male, still pursues jobs demanding long daily hours and many continuous years of employment
68. Montana Women in the 80s, supra note 23, at 4.
69. Id. at 3.
70. Id. at 13.
71. Id. at 86-87.
72. Id. at 88-89.
692
73. As the Montana Supreme Court observed in Miller- Wohl,__ Mont. at -,
P.2d at 1246:
In family households the need for two paychecks spreads across the economic
spectrum. Even young upwardly mobile professionals (Yuppies), like a biplane,
need two wings working to stay aloft. Economic necessity has converged with the
growing insistence of women for equal opportunity in all fields to bring about legislative enactments such as the MMLA.
74. See Williams, supra note 44, at 333-34 for analysis of the gender-segregated
workforce.
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uninterrupted by family obligations. The other workforce, largely
female, finds jobs flexible enough to accommodate their family obligations only in part-time, low-paying, dead-end, or high-turnover
employment.
In 1960 before Title VII was enacted, over seventy-five percent
of female workers held traditionally female jobs such as clerical
work, nursing, teaching, sales, and other services. 7 5 In 1983,
nineteen years after Title VII's enactment, women's segregation in
these traditionally female jobs remained virtually unchanged at
about seventy-six percent.7 6 Montana women's experience in the
same period parallels the national experience." In 1980, about
ninety-five percent of the national male workforce and eighty-five
percent of the Montana male workforce worked full-time. Of the
female workforce, on the other hand, eighty percent nationally was
employed full time and only sixty-two percent of the Montana female workforce was employed full time. 8
Not surprisingly, the pay differential between men and women
reflects this segregation of the workforce. For the past thirty years,
American women's median income in proportion to men's has remained unchanged at about sixty percent. By 1980, Montana
women's median income in proportion to Montana men's was even
lower at a scant fifty percent.7 9 The segregation of the workforce
along gender lines clearly reflects men's and women's disproportionate responsibility for child care. 80
Family responsibilities impede women's entry into the
workforce as well as their advancement. Between 1950 and 1980
U.S. and Montana unemployment rates for men exceeded rates for
women in only one year. Accounting for the disparate unemployment rates was the fact that unlike men, women stepped in and
out of the workforce in order to raise children. 1 As of 1982,
twenty-six percent of married mothers and thirty-five percent of
single mothers did not even seek work-and hence did not show up
on unemployment rolls-because affordable child care was unavailable.2 The conclusion becomes inescapable that as long as women
remain primarily responsible for child care, equal employment opportunity for women will remain contingent on their status as
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Montana Women in the 80s, supra note 23, at 27.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 12.
Id. at v.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 60.
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mothers or non-mothers. Legal advances such as Title VII, the
PDA, and the MMLA have failed to ameliorate the disparate impact a workplace structured on a male norm has on women as a
class.
III.

THE MILLER-WOHL DEBATE

Legal commentators generally agree that to achieve equal employment opportunity for women, dramatic changes in the workplace designed to accommodate conflicting family obligations must
take place. 3 Sincere disagreement arises, however, over what legal
analysis can best support these changes. National attention has focused84 on Montana recently because of a constitutional challenge
to the state's ground breaking maternity leave act in Miller-Wohl
5 Montana's MMLA
v. Commissioner of Labor and Industry."
had
certainly forced change in the workplace to accommodate the family obligation of pregnancy, but litigants disagreed whether principled legal analysis could justify the change.
A.

The Dispute

In 1979 the Miller-Wohl Company fired Tamara Buley instead
of granting her a maternity leave to accommodate her pregnancyrelated disability."6 In its appeal to the Montana Supreme Court,
Miller-Wohl did not dispute that by firing Buley it had violated
the MMLA. Rather, Miller-Wohl argued that the PDA preempted
83. See, e.g., Krieger & Cooney, supra note 49, at 519; Williams, supra note 44, at 37778; Comment, Childbearing and Childrearing,supra note 24, at 1179-82.
84. Recent law review publications addressing the Miller-Wohl case include: Kay,
supra note 44; Krieger & Cooney, supra note 44; Williams, supra note 44; Childbearingand
Childrearing,supra note 24.
85. __
Mont. -, 692 P.2d 1293, vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 919 (1987),
original judgment reinstated, __
Mont. ,P.2d
-, 44 St. Rptr. 1718 (1987).
The case has a complicated procedural history. After losing the administrative hearing in
the Department of Labor and Industry, Miller-Wohl sought declaratory judgment relief in
federal district court. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 515 F. Supp.
1264 (1981). District Court Judge Paul Hatfield denied Miller-Wohl relief. Id. at 1268.
Miller-Wohl appealed. Miller-Wohl, 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that federal courts lacked jurisdiction in the matter. Id. at 1091. MillerWohl next filed its appeal of the administrative ruling in state district court, which held for
Miller-Wohl. The Commissioner of Labor and Industry and claimant Buley appealed the
decision to the Montana Supreme Court. Miller-Wohl v. Commissioner of Labor and Indus.,
Mont.
., 692 P.2d 1243 (1984). When the Montana court reversed the district court,
Miller-Wohl appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The high court vacated the Montana
court's judgment and remanded the case for further consideration. 107 S. Ct. 919 (1987).
The Montana Supreme Court then reinstated its earlier judgment and also awarded claimant attorney fees. Miller-Wohl, _
Mont. , 744 P.2d 871 (1987).
86. Miller-Wohl, Mont. at __ , 692 P.2d at 1245-46.
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the MMLA and that the company was in compliance with the less
stringent requirements of the federal law."7 Further, Miller-Wohl
argued that the MMLA violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment by excluding men and nonpregnant women
from the preferential leave mandated for pregnant workers.8 8 The
company's personnel rules provided comprehensive disability
leaves for both sexes upon the completion of a year's employment
and the rules were therefore gender-neutral. Miller-Wohl claimed
that if forced to comply with the MMLA and grant maternity
leaves to pregnant workers like Buley within the first year of their
employment, the company would have to discriminate unlawfully
against all men and nonpregnant women who did not qualify for
disability leaves until the second year of their employment. It was
impossible to comply with the MMLA, then, without violating the
PDA by indeed discriminating among workers in employment benefits on the basis of pregnancy. 9
Miller-Wohl's appeal before the Montana Supreme Court provided a heated forum for advocates of different legal analyses in
achieving employment equality.9 0 Nine amici curiae headed up by
the American Civil Liberties Union agreed that the MMLA unlawfully mandates preferential treatment of pregnant workers.," The
ACLU amici recognized that facially-neutral no-leave policies such
as Miller-Wohl's could have a disparate impact on female workers
since only female workers risk pregnancy disability.92 Of greater
danger to employment equality, however, is the sanctioning of
preferential or special treatment for pregnant workers. "Distinctions based on pregnancy," the ACLU amici observed, "share the
disadvantage of other sex-based distinctions. They are inherently
dangerous, tending to perpetuate the stereotype of women's primary role and function as childbearer, not as wage earner." 93 The
ACLU amici warned that unless the court embraced the principle
of achieving employment equality through equal treatment of the
87. Id. at -,
692 P.2d at 1248-49.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. For classification of the litigants' approaches this comment relies on Williams,
supra note 44.
91. Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, et al. at 1, Miller-Wohl Co.
v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., Mont. -,
692 P.2d 1243 (1984). The American
Civil Liberties Union represented itself, the ACLU of Montana, the National Organization
for Women, the Montana State NOW, the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, the
League of Women Voters of the United States, the League of Women Voters of Montana,
the National Women's Law Center, and the Women's Legal Defense Fund.
92. Id. at 30-31.
93. Id. at 13-14.
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sexes, the court would give new life to the old protectionist legisla4
tion which for so long barred women's entry into the workforce.
Instead, the ACLU amici proposed that the court exercise its authority to bring the MMLA into compliance with Title VII by recasting the MMLA's mandate for reasonable disability leaves in
gender-neutral terms.9 5 By extending the opportunity for disability
leave to all workers, the court could preserve the legislature's intent to assure pregnant workers necessary leave, but achieve that
goal without discriminating against nonpregnant women and

men. 96
The Commissioner of Labor and Industry, 97 the complainant
herself, and three separate amici, 98 on the other hand, argued that
the PDA did not preempt the MMLA. Congress did not intend to
"occupy the field" of civil rights legislation and therefore any state
legislation consonant with the purpose of Title VII must stand.
Facially-neutral policies denying disability leave to all workers do
impose a disparate impact on female workers because they alone
face the risk of pregnancy. The MMLA is therefore consonant with
the purposes of Title VII since it protects female workers from the
disparate impact of facially-neutral no-leave policies like MillerWohl's.9 9 Finally, these litigants argued, even if the MMLA accords preferential or "special" treatment to a gender-based class,
the fourteenth amendment does not bar such treatment. The legislature identified and protected an important state interest-the
right to bear children without loss of employment-when it enacted the MMLA. Thus, the MMLA's gender-based classifications
can pass the constitutional test of showing a substantial relationship to an important state interest. 10 0
Miller-Wohl's appeal to the Montana Supreme Court served
as a new forum for the long-raging debate on how best to achieve
equality in employment. Advocates of equal treatment of the sexes
like the ACLU amici would extend leave policies to include disability and family leave for both sexes. Under a universal disability
leave policy, neither the female wage earner's pregnancy nor the
94. Id. at 14.
95. Id. at 33.
96. Id. at 34.
97. At the time Buley filed her complaint, the Department of Labor and Industry accepted and processed complaints under the MMLA. In 1983 the legislature moved MMLA
administrative authority to the Montana Human Rights Commission.
98. The other amici were the Montana Human Rights Commission, the Women's Law
Section of the Montana State Bar, and the Montana Education Association.
99. Miller-Wohl, - Mont. at -,
692 P.2d at 1248.
100. Id.
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male wage earner's sex-based disability would threaten the family's
livelihood. Moreover, because under the equal treatment approach
no law stereotypes either parent as primarily responsible for child
care, both sexes are free to exercise progressive employment practices such as flex time to care for their children. 10 1
Critics of the equal treatment approach identify reproductive
freedom as the core issue in their disparate impact analysis. Of
course both sexes face disabilities unique to their sex and hence
no-leave policies adversely affect both sexes' participation in the
workforce. The telling comparison is not between sex-based disabilities, however, but between the consequences to each sex of deciding to reproduce. Only women face termination from employment and other adverse employment practices as a result of their
decision to reproduce, i.e., as a result of pregnancy.1 02 Legislation
such as the MMLA merely assures through special treatment of
pregnancy that neither sex faces discrimination as a consequence
of exercising his or her constitutionally protected right to
103
reproduce.
B.

The Court Resolution

Justice John Sheehy, writing for a unanimous Montana Supreme Court, conscientiously weighed each of the litigant's positions, noting that "Sorting out the legal issues in this case is like
walking through a hall of mirrors, so many facets are presented
.... ,"104The court essentially agreed with the approach of the litigants who argued that the PDA does not preempt the MMLA. The
MMLA effected the purpose of Title VII and the PDA by preventing disparate impact discrimination against women. Miller-Wohl's
no-leave policy worked an impermissible disparate impact on
women because, by risking pregnancy, women faced grounds for
termination which men did not. 10 5 This finding paved the way for
the court's equal protection analysis as well. The court denied that
the MMLA conferred preferential treatment on pregnant workers.
Instead the court held that:
101. See Williams, supra note 44, at 367-68 for this analysis of the equal treatment
approach.
102. See Kay, supra note 44, at 33-35, for this analysis of the special treatment
approach.
103. "[T]here is a right 'to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into mattars so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.'"
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S., 632, 640 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972)).
104. Mi~ler-Wohl, Mont. at __, 692 P.2d at 1252.
105. Id.
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[Bly removing pregnancy-related disabilities as a legal grounds
for discharge from employment, the MMLA places men and
women on more equal terms. All workers, male or female, disabled for any reason other than pregnancy are still treated identically ....
The MMLA merely makes it illegal for an employer to
burden female employees in such a way as to deprive them
of
10 6
employment opportunities because of their different role.
The Montana Supreme Court thus used the Gilbert court's
analysis in reverse. Both courts viewed pregnancy as an "additional risk" women bring to the workplace. The additional risk of
pregnancy justifies neither an additional benefit of insurance coverage under Gilbert, nor an additional burden of loss of employment under the Montana court's analysis. Analytically, the MMLA
merely forces accommodation of the exception of pregnancy in a
workplace defined by the male norm of no pregnancy. According to
the Miller-Wohl court, accommodating the exception of pregnancy
assures pregnant workers equal, not preferential, treatment. Seemingly uneasy nonetheless about claims of preferential treatment
under the MMLA, the Montana court urged in its conclusion that
the upcoming legislature seriously consider the ACLU amici's proposal to redraft the MMLA to mandate leave for all disabled
10 7
workers.
Miller-Wohl appealed the Montana Supreme Court's decision
to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1985. In January of 1987, the high
court remanded the case to the Montana court for further consideration01 in light of its January decision in a closely-related case,
California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra.0 9 In
Guerra the employer challenged the validity of a California statute
mandating that employers provide pregnancy disability leave and
requiring reinstatement upon completion of the leave.1 10 Just like
Miller-Wohl, Guerra's employer charged that the PDA preempted
the California statute so similar to Montana's and that the federal
equal protection clause invalidated the statute. Justice Marshall's
reasoning in upholding the California statute closely parallels Justice Sheehy's in upholding the MMLA. The PDA does not preempt
any state legislation such as the California leave statute which is
consonant with the purpose of Title VII."' States are free to man106. Id. at 1254 (quoting Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 515 F.
Supp. 1264, 1266 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982)).
107. Miller-Wohl, - Mont. at -,
692 P.2d at 1255.
108. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 107 S. Ct. 919 (1987).
109. 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 693.
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date pregnancy disability leaves, though the PDA has no such
mandates, because "Congress intended the PDA to be 'a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-not a
ceiling above which they may not rise.' "112 State pregnancy disability leave statutes do not violate federal equal protection requirements, moreover, because they "[allow] women, as well as men, to
have families without losing their jobs."'1 3 Finally, even if such
statutes do confer preferential treatment on pregnant workers, employers need only extend the same level of disability benefits to all
1 4
workers in order to comply with both state and federal statutes. 1
Because the Guerra decision clearly supported the Montana Supreme Court's earlier judgment, the Montana court reinstated that
judgment in October, 1987." 5
IV.

UNSETTLED ISSUES IN FEDERAL DISCRIMINATION ANALYSIS

The decisions in Guerra and Miller-Wohl, though at the
center of recent debate, have by no means resolved how legal analysis may most effectively support eradication of sex discrimination
in employment. Indeed, recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions point
up the inadequacy of both the equal treatment and special treatment approaches in achieving equal employment opportunity for
the vast majority of working women, working mothers. Both analyses focus on how working mothers can fit, by equal or special treatment, in a workplace defined by male norms. Neither legal analysis
therefore compels the fundamental workplace structural changes
required to integrate female as well as male norms into the
workplace.
Two U.S. Supreme Court cases reflecting on pregnancy disability illustrate how both approaches fail in this regard. In the 1983
case of Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC""
the Supreme Court struck down a provision in an employee insurance plan that excluded from coverage the pregnancies of employees' wives. While female employees received pregnancy benefits
under the plan, male workers received no such benefits for their
wives. Female employees' husbands received full medical coverage,
but male employees' wives did not. The court held that the insurance plan discriminated against male employees by depriving them
112.
(1985)).
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 692 (quoting California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396
Guerra, 758 F.2d at 694.
Id. at 694-95.
Miller-Wohl, __
Mont.
462 U.S. 669 (1983).

-,

744 P.2d 871 (1987).
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of the full spousal coverage that female employees received. By enacting the PDA and "making clear that an employer could not discriminate on the basis of an employee's pregnancy, Congress did
not erase the original prohibition [in Title VII] against discrimina1' 17
tion on the basis of an employee's sex.
How the Court could distinguish analytically between male
employees' claims to equivalent spousal coverage in Newport News
and male employees' potential claims for equivalent leaves under a
preferential statute such as the MMLA or California's in Guerra is
difficult to perceive. The Newport News Court seemed to suggest
that the permissable method for assuring equal protection for all
workers is to extend now special pregnancy benefits to all workers.
The Montana Legislature should therefore extend the MMLA's
leave benefits to all disabled workers, just as the Miller-Wohl court
recommended. 18
The Newport News case also illustrates, however, the vulnerability of a special treatment approach on either Title VII or equal
protection grounds. Under the authority of the PDA and state
childbearing disability laws, courts now recognize that employment
policies excluding childbearing work a disparate impact on women.
No compelling statutory authority yet exists, though, on which female employees responsible for childrearing can base a claim of
disparate impact. Though women are in fact disproportionately responsible for childrearing, nothing biologically compels this division of responsibility. Thus courts may freely conclude that employment policies adversely affecting workers with childrearing
responsibilities are gender neutral. On the other hand, if an employment policy did accommodate working mothers, for example
by granting flex time to working mothers, a reviewing court faces
two choices. The Court may either strike the policy as violative of
Title VII, or it may extend equal protection under the policy to
working fathers. Absent statutory authority for protection of childrearing, courts are likelier to strike the accommodating policy
rather than to extend it. The special treatment analysis presents a
"catch 22."
While equal treatment proponents can hail the Newport News
decision for its judicial extension of insurance coverage to all workers, the equal treatment approach does not always result in the
parity of the sexes Newport News achieved. In Wimberly v. Labor
and Industrial Relations Commission of Missouri,11 9 also decided
117. Id. at 685.
118. Miller-Wohl, - Mont. at
119. 107 S. Ct. 821 (1987).

-,

692 P.2d at 1255.
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in January of 1987, the Court refused to extend benefits to prevent
disparate impact discrimination. In that case, Wimberly's job was
filled while she was on pregnancy leave and she could not return to
work. Wimberly applied for state unemployment insurance benefits, but was denied on the grounds that her reason for leaving
work, pregnancy, was not "directly attributable to the work or to
the employer" as state law required. 2 ' The U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the state action, averring that the state law disqualifying
Wimberly was gender neutral. "If a state adopts a neutral rule that
incidentally disqualifies pregnant claimants as part of a larger
group, the neutral application of that rule cannot readily be characterized as a decision made solely on the basis of pregnancy."121
By using the equal treatment approach, the Court upheld the
"facially-neutral" policy of excluding all workers who leave work
for non-employment reasons.
The Wimberly Court repeated the Gilbert court's analytical
error. The Wimberly Court failed to recognize that a facially-neutral policy adversely affecting pregnant workers has a disparate impact on women. Instead, the Wimberly Court myopically focused
on whether the state applied the facially-neutral policy to men and
women equally. Left unquestioned was whether the facially-neutral
policy itself incorporated a male norm, that of not leaving work
except for employment-related reasons. When tested against this
male norm, women with childbearing and childrearing responsibilities cannot justify their child care absences from work. As long as
women remain primarily responsible for child care, the faciallyneutral policy condoning only employment-related absences perpetuates the traditional gender-based division of family obligations
and employment.
A final complicating issue in choosing between equal treatment and special treatment analysis is the difficulty in distinguishing between their implementation. The Guerra court held that
California's pregnancy leave requirement merely assured equal
treatment so that no worker, male or female, faced discharge as a
result of deciding to have a family. 22 Somewhat defensively, however, the Guerra court concluded its analysis by stating that even
if the pregnancy leave requirement was preferential treatment, the
employer could meet equal protection requirements by extending
leave to all disabled workers.1 23 The Miller-Wohl court expressed
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 824.
Id. at 825.
Guerra, 758 F.2d at 694.
Id. at 694-95.
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similar misgivings about whether the MMLA mandated equal or
preferential treatment for pregnant workers." Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish legally those policies that protect certain classes
against discrimination from those that confer preferential
treatment.
The 1981 U.S. Supreme Court case of Monroe v. Standard Oil
involving provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service
Act further illustrates this point.1" 5 The Universal Military Training and Service Act, like the Montana and California pregnancy
leave acts, requires employers to grant military reservists sufficient
leave to fulfill their military obligations.' 2 6 Unlike pregnancy leave
acts, the military act further requires employers to reinstate reservists to the full status they would have attained had they not
periodically left work on military leave.'12 The Act thus ensures
reservists advancement in the workforce commensurate with coworkers who do not bear military obligations. In the Monroe case,
the employer accommodated the reservist's military leave in its
work schedule. The reservist claimed that the company should also
specially reschedule his work hours so that he could work as many
hours and receive the same amount of company pay as his coworkers.
The Monroe Court denied the reservist's claim on the grounds
that Congress did not intend to require employers to grant reservists "preferential" treatment.' 28 In a note to this holding, the Court
admitted that the accommodated leave and guaranteed advancement requirements of the Act could themselves be viewed as "preferential" treatment for reservists. The court decided, however, that
"This sort of treatment . . . is better understood as protection
against discrimination for reserve obligations than as preferential
treatment accorded solely because of reserve status.' 2 9 The Wimberly Court noted this Monroe holding distinguishing between
anti-discrimination measures and preferential treatment.'3 0 By ignoring the disparate impact aspect of the case, however, the Court
was able to conclude that if Wimberly received unemployment
benefits, she would receive unlawful "preferential treatment."' 3 '
The U.S. Supreme Court has thus determined that far reaching
124. Miller-Wohl, - Mont. at 125. 429 U.S. 549 (1981).
126. Id. at 552.
127. Id. at 552 n.3.
128. Id. at 561.
129. Id. at 561 n.12.
130. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 825.
131. Id. at 826.

, 692 P.2d at 1255.
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workplace accommodations for military obligations are not preferential treatment, while a modest unemployment insurance accommodation for family obligations is preferential treatment. While it
is easy to imagine any number of considerations motivating the
court to evaluate military and family obligations differently, the
cases evince no consistent legal principle. If there ever were meaningful distinctions between preferential policies and those designed
to prevent discrimination, recent Supreme Court cases have thus
blurred them.
V.

TOWARD A MONTANA DISCRIMINATION ANALYSIS

A.

Judicial Analysis

Since passage in 1972 of the Montana Constitution's dignity
clause, 132 the Montana Supreme Court has applied federal discrimination analysis to Montana sex discrimination cases.1 3 3 Developed
under the authority of Title VII and the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment, federal discrimination analysis fails to
recognize the breadth of the guarantees embodied in the Montana
constitutional mandate. That mandate prohibits sex discrimination
in order to assure equality and human dignity: "The dignity of the
human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws. Neither the state, nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate . . . on account of...
sex." 3 " When delegates to the 1972 Constitutional Convention
unanimously endorsed this guarantee, they understood that the
scope of the prohibition and its synthesis of human rights were
unprecedented in American law.13 5 The Montana Constitution inextricably fuses the right of equal protection, inviolable human
dignity, and freedom from discrimination." 6 By ignoring that fu132. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
133. Not only has the court adopted Title VII analysis for cases arising under the
Montana Human Rights Act (MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303; Martinez, __
Mont. at ,
626 P.2d at 245), but it has also relied on federal constitutional equal protection analysis in
its few opportunities to interpret Montana's very different dignity clause. See, e.g., State v.
Craig, - Mont.
, -,
545 P.2d 649, 652-53 (1975); In re C.H.,
- Mont. ..
-,
638 P.2d 931, 939 (1984). In those cases the court has focused narrowly on the phrase
"equal protection" which appears in both state and federal constitutions.
134. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
135. V Montana Constitutional Convention 1971-72, 1642 & 1646 (1979) [hereinafter
MONT. CONST. CONV.i. Delegate Mansfield for the subcommittee on the bill of rights explained that even the proposed ERA "would not explicitly provide as much protection as"
the Montana dignity clause, and that the clause barred "private as well as public discrimination." Id. at 1642.
136. As originally drafted, the clause contained two sentences. The first sentence concerning inviolable human dignity remained unchanged. The second sentence combined the
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sion, the Court has effected but part of the constitution's equality
and dignity guarantee.'37 The Montana bar must shoulder responsibility for this judicial lapse. In the course of every discrimination
action they bring,'3 8 Montana lawyers should consciously develop
the legal meaning of the constitution's equality and dignity
clause.'s 9
The threshold question in federal sex discrimination analysis
is whether an employer treats individuals or classes equally. The
question is loaded. Hidden within the seemingly objective federal
question is the assumption that a workplace premised on a male
norm is gender neutral. The male norm includes the typical workplace standard that employees may advance only through uninterrupted dedication to employment and that family obligations must
not interfere with employment. By permitting exclusion of
childbearing and childrearing responsibilities from the workplace,
this equal treatment standard results inexorably in the exclusion of
women as well. The second question in the federal analysis is
whether employment policies work a disparate impact on women.
Disparate impact analysis has permitted special accommodation of
at least childbearing responsibilities in the workplace. This special
treatment analysis merely inquires, however, how women can be
fitted like square pegs in round holes into a workplace inherently
hostile to their disproportionate responsibility for child care. Federal discrimination analysis therefore never reaches the question
how the workplace must fundamentally change. To achieve equal
employment opportunity, the workplace must not merely accommodate women, but rather must structurally reflect gender-neutral
or integrated norms.
Responding to the state constitutional mandate, Montana lawyers should jettison federal discrimination analysis in favor of a
Montana analysis free of gender-based standards. The better analequal protection and anti-discrimination clauses. The convention divided this second sentence into two separate sentences for stylistic and not substantive reasons. VII Mont. Const.
Conv., supra note 135, at 2477, 2921.
137. The court has focused narrowly on the phrase "equal protection," comparing it to
the federal constitutional guarantee. See supra note 133.
138. Montana lawyers can develop the additional constitutional basis of their cases
even in actions arising under the Montana Human Rights Act (MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2303) and proceeding through the administrative remedies. Note that the constitution's dignity clause is self-enforcing. V Mont. Const. Conv., supra note 135, at 1644-45.
139. For discussion of developing unique state constitutional provisions, see Collins,
Reliance on State Constitutions:The Montana Disaster,63 TEx. L. REV. 1095 (1985); Williams, Equality Guarantees in State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1195 (1985); and
American Civil Liberties Union of Montana, Continuing Legal Education Seminar: Individual Rights and the Montana Constitution (1986).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1988

25

Montana Law Review, Vol. 49 [1988], Iss. 1, Art. 11

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

ysis would posit what the workplace would be like if historically
men had not only enjoyed full participation in the workforce, but
had also enjoyed equal responsibility for child care. If the vast majority of workers, including key employees, had conflicting family
obligations, the workplace would have developed structurally to integrate those family obligations into norms for workers. It is easy
to imagine, for example, a workplace responding to a majority of
workers' needs with attached child care centers and comprehensive
leave policies for childbirth and sick child care. More imaginative
employment policies would include leave to attend children's
school activities and leave to participate in community activities.4 °
Like military reservists, workers with family obligations would
take leave secure in the assurance that they could compete equally
for advancement. Indeed, once freed from the status quo as a standard against which to measure equal opportunity, discrimination
analysis can envision workplace policies truly integrating the many
facets of human experience.
Of course, this visioning process of an integrated workplace in
a legal analysis will require consistent guidance from fundamental
legal principles. Montana's unique constitutional mandate itself
prompts the threshold question for Montana employment discrimination analysis: Does the employer treat individuals and classes
with equal dignity?14 1 This threshold question incorporates none of
the assumptions of the status quo workplace, nor does it stereotype
the role of either sex in society. Rather, it returns discrimination
analysis to the constitutional premise that human dignity shall not
be violated.
Montana lawyers may well have delayed the task of developing the term "dignity" in discrimination analysis because standard
legal authorities provide no gloss for the term.1" 2 The sheer volume
140. This comment considers workplace changes necessary to integrate childbearing
and childrearing responsibilities into norms for workers because the workplace is now premised on a male norm. A fuller exploration of the possibilities under the Montana Constitution's dignity clause would include changes necessary to integrate community responsibilities into norms for workers as well. Reasons for granting leave might then include care for
sick parents and friends, rendering aid in a community disaster, and even participation in
more usual community activities. Election Day, for example, is a state holiday in Montana.
Employers observing this holiday help assure that workers' obligations as citizens in a democracy need not conflict with their obligations as employees.
141. See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, at 227 (1978). This outline for a Montana sex discrimination analysis also draws on the valuable analysis found in Scales, The
Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence:An Essay, 95 YALE L. J. 1373 (1986) and in Krieger
& Cooney, supra note 44, at 536-72.
142. The Constitutional Convention cited only the Puerto Rican declaration of rights
as a source for Montana's dignity clause. V Mont. Const. Conv., supra note 135, at 1642.
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of possible non-legal resources for the term, many of them indigenous to Montana, is daunting. The resources of history, literature,
and philosophy, 143 as they seek to describe and value human relations, can perhaps best inform a constitutional understanding of
dignity. Any sophisticated analysis of the constitutional term dignity lies beyond the scope of this comment. As a starting point for
a new discrimination analysis, however, two features of dignity require notice. First, dignity is an inherent human attribute, independent of a person's role or station in society. Second, dignity is
also an attribute of how people relate to one another, becoming
manifest when people treat each other with dignity. A standard
dictionary definition of dignity supplies these inherent and relational aspects of dignity. 144 The constitution's guarantee of "inviolable human dignity" means at least "inherent nobility and worth"
commanding the respect of others. 145 Discrimination analysis,
therefore, should inquire whether employers respect workers' inherent nobility and worth.
Under federal sex discrimination analysis, the employer's requirements are the sole measure of workers' worth. 14 6 In Sprogis 7
and Phillips," for example, federal courts permitted employers to
value workers only for their uninterrupted dedication to employment, according no respect for workers' conflicting family obligations. Because Congress by statute recognizes the value of military
service, on the other hand, federal courts insist that employers respect military reservists' obligations. Federal law prohibiting employment discrimination against reservists manifests respect for
their service. The Montana Constitution also prohibits discrimination based on human attributes which must command respect from
employers. The dignity clause of the constitution recognizes "race,
color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious
143. For example, Montana resources for elucidating the term might include K. Ross
Toole, Chief Joseph, Wallace Stegner, Jeannette Rankin, and Richard Hugo. The dignity
clause itself provides some guidance in choosing appropriate resources from the near endless
possibilities. Like the clause, sources should themselves accord dignity to "race, color, sex,
culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas." MONT.CONST. art. II, § 4.
The Constitutional Convention emphasized that the dignity clause did not protect only
"mainstream Montana," but instead sought to include all facets of human experience. V
Mont. Const. Conv., supra note 135, at 1642. Jurists attempting to understand the constitutional import of dignity should therefore look beyond "mainstream Montana" for more allinclusive standards.
144. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, at 369 (1981).
145. Id.
146. Often federal discrimination analysis turns on whether a "bona fide occupational
qualification" justifies the employer's sex discrimination under § 703(e) of Title VII.
147. See discussion infra at section I(A) of this comment.
148. See discussion infra at section I(A) of this comment.
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ideas" 149 as human attributes commanding respect. While none of
these attributes may benefit an employer, in Montana they must
be valued nonetheless.
When responding to the 1972 constitutional mandate to eradicate sex discrimination in employment, the legislature certainly
contemplated more than women's ability to fulfill an employer's
requirements. In 1973 the legislature enacted employment policies
for women designed to "enable women to contribute to society according to their fullest possible potential." 150 Legislative policy implementing the new constitution thus respects not just women's
job performance, but also their inherent worth and value to society
as a whole. Indeed, pursuant to this policy, the legislature instructed the Department of Labor and Industry to "direct public
attention to critical employment problems confronting women as
wives, mothers, homemakers, and workers." '5 1 These early legislative programs inform Montana's dignity clause with recognition of
women's family and societal relations, as well as their employment
relations. When recast in gender-neutral terms, the legislature's
concern refines the dignity inquiry in Montana employment discrimination analysis: Do employment policies accord people respect for serving as spouses, parents, and homemakers, as well as
for serving as workers?152 When inquiring whether an employer
treats a worker with dignity, then, the analysis should reach beyond the workers' value to the employer and embody respect for
the worker's contribution to family and community life as well.
The principle of dignity need not await further legislative implementation for use in a Montana sex discrimination action. Suppose, for example, that a female employee misses work in order to
care for her sick child and her employer fires her. In almost any
job an employee may miss a day of work for his or her own illness.
The employee has no express legal right, however, to miss a day of
work for his or her child's illness, no matter how serious. Policies
sanctioning leave for personal but not family illness reflect the
traditional sex-based division of home life and employment. Traditionally the workplace manifested no concern for an employee's
sick child since assuredly a homemaker remained responsible for
child care. Today, when both parents in a family work or when the
family depends on a single parent, policies prohibiting absences for
149. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
150. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-7-101 (1987).
151. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-7-101 (1987).
152. Note that these roles are far from all-inclusive. As suggested before, policies
should also accord people respect for their service as citizens, neighbors, and friends.
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the care of sick children affront human dignity. Montana lawyers
should prosecute and Montana courts should recognize the fired
employee's cause of action for sex discrimination denigrating her
human dignity. Employers must respect the worker's contribution
as a parent as well as an employee.
The second constitutional principle for Montana sex discrimination analysis is the guarantee of equal protection. 153 Employers
must treat individuals and classes with equal dignity. For example,
does the MMLA's guaranteed pregnancy leave for women fundamentally satisfy equal protection? As construed by the Montana
Supreme Court, 15 4 statutory pregnancy leave in Montana includes
a time after birth when women recover from labor. During this period, new mothers also have the chance to "bond" with their
newborns. Because men do not become pregnant, however, men are
denied any guaranteed right of leave for a newborn and any right
to bond. Equal protection must mandate that new fathers have at
least as much opportunity to bond with their infants as new
mothers. 1 55 Again, Montana lawyers should prosecute and Montana courts should recognize the male worker's cause of action for
equal rights to employment leave for childbirth and child care.'15
This proposed Montana analysis of employment discrimination incorporates aspects of both the special and equal treatment
approaches. First, and drawing from the special treatment analysis,
the Montana inquiry recognizes that equal employment opportunity can be achieved only when the workplace integrates workers'
responsibilities for childbearing and childrearing. As long as the
workplace fails to integrate these responsibilities, it reflects a male
norm which must always be hostile to female workers. Second, and
as the equal treatment analysis emphasizes, workplace structural
changes for parenting must extend to men and women equally.
153. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
154. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Comm. of Labor and Indus., - Mont. -,
608 P.2d 1047, 1062 (1980).
155. See Comment, Childbearing and Childrearing,supra note 24, at 1180 for the
source of this analysis.
156. In sum, the proposed Montana sex discrimination analysis proceeds as follows:
(1) Does the employer treat-workers with equal dignity? That is, does the workplace structure accord respect to workers' family and community obligations as well as to their employment obligations? Moreover, does the workplace assure treatment of the sexes as equals in
their family, community, and employment obligations? If not, ask (2) How would the workplace now be structured had workers of both sexes always shared family, community, and
employment obligations equally? To guide this visioning of alternatives, ask (3) Does the
workplace structure posited in the second step of the analysis accord respect to workers'
family and community obligations, as well as to their employment obligations; and (4) Does
the workplace structure posited in the second step of the analysis assure treatment of the
sexes as equals in their family, community, and employment obligations?
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Workplace structures permitting only women to fulfill family obligations perpetuate the sex-based division of home and work responsibilities. As long as women disproportionately assume child
care responsibilities, they shall remain disproportionately relegated
to marginal employment.
Finally, the proposed Montana analysis frees courts from the
overly-formalistic equal treatment/disparate impact analysis which
has resulted in so much inconsistency in federal analysis. If instead
Montana courts inquire whether the workplace treats men and
women with equal dignity, courts may review men's and women's
collective experience in the community, the home, and at work.
Domination by either sex in either realm then becomes a touchstone for a finding of unlawful discrimination. Notably, the analysis departs from the conventional legal focus on the individual
worker's ability to meet the individual employer's requirements.
Examined instead are the effects of employment on the entire
community of employers, workers, and their families. Montana
lawyers should take this collective perspective when developing
Montana's equality and dignity clause. While the constitution declares the dignity of the individual inviolable, constitutional analysis must turn on the respect accorded individuals in their relations
with others. Moreover, the constitutional guarantee of equality demands comparisons of groups, not of individuals. The constitution
cannot mandate the equality of any two individuals. Clearly, however, the constitution mandates treating the two sexes collectively
as equals. These relational and group aspects of constitutional
analysis compel a collective perspective in Montana discrimination
litigation.
The workplace status quo reflects neither equality of the sexes
nor respect for workers' relations with others. As long as the Montana bar clings to federal discrimination analysis and fails to envision a workplace encompassing both male and female norms, the
status quo will prevail and the Montana constitutional imperative
will remain frustrated.
B.

Legislation

The 1972 Constitutional Convention urged the legislature to
enact positive programs eradicating sex discrimination. By 1975
the legislature had responded with passage of the MMLA and the
other employment programs for women. Compared to the rest of
the nation, Montana took an early lead in statutorily changing the
structure of the workplace to promote equal employment opportunity for women. Compared to the nations of the world, however,
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Montana and the United States remain quite backward. Among
the industrialized nations, only the United States fails to provide
comprehensive programs enabling parents of both sexes to share
equally and fully in the workplace and in family life. 5 7 These programs include not only unpaid leave for both parents of newborns
and sick children, but also paid parenting leave and government
sponsored day care. 158 Such programs are not mere legislative gratuities. Rather, a commitment to eradicating sex discrimination in
the workplace compels the enactment of such programs.
It is telling that Congress has provided an affirmative program
to assure military reservists (mostly male) both paid leave and full
participation in the workplace, and yet has failed so far to enact
any such programs assuring the working primary parent (mostly
female) the same equal employment opportunity. While Congress
will not likely enact such family legislation soon, 5 9 the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions in Guerra and Wimberly do give
states rather free rein to act in the congressional vacuum for the
advancement of employment equality. Those decisions recognized
the minimal reach of federal anti-discrimination law, and showed
great deference to state policies and programs. Now that the Montana Supreme Court has reinstated its judgment in Miller-Wohl,
the legislature can heed the court's urging to extend the MMLA's
unpaid leave provisions to cover all worker disabilities. Moreover,
the legislature should strike another blow at the sex-based division
between family life and the workplace by extending leave for
newborns to fathers. In early 1987 the Minnesota Legislature took
the lead from Montana in promoting employment equality when it
enacted unpaid leave provisions for both mothers and fathers of
157. See Comment, Childbearing and Childrearing,supra note 24, at 1180.
158. One hundred and twenty-seven nations provide some form of parenting leave. At
least ten western nations provide paid leave, including Canada, Japan, and Sweden. Sweden's program encourages -parents to divide compensated leave time between them. See
Krieger & Cooney, supra note 44, at 377-78; Family and Medical Leave Act Summary, H.R.
925, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H527-28 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1987).
159. Representatives Clay and Schroeder introduced the Family and Medical Leave
Act, H.R. 925, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) in January of 1987. After bipartisan compromise
in the house, the Act would require employers of fifty or more employees to provide unpaid
family leave for the birth or adoption of a child and for the illness of a child or parent. The
Act would also require provision of unpaid medical leave for an employee's own disability.
Key employees and employees with less than a year of employment would be exempt from
the plan. The Act also authorizes a study of national insurance for paid parenting and disability leave. The exemptions in the Act are too broad (eighty percent of employers), but
passage of the Act would be a critical step forward. Proponents of the Act stress hardships
on families as the Act's rationale, rather than the necessity of parenting leave for the
achievement of equal employment opportunity. See Family and Medical Leave Act Summary, supra note 158.
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newborns or adopted children.18° Montana should follow Minnesota's new lead. Finally, the legislature should authorize a new subcommittee study of legislation necessary to implement Montana's
constitutional equality and dignity clause. The study agenda
should at a minimum include examination of comprehensive child
care leave programs for parents and an examination of state-subsidized day care. Further, the subcommittee should look at current
examples of state-sponsored disability insurance programs for
methods of funding paid parenting leave programs and day care
programs."'
In the session following passage of the 1972 constitution, the
legislature established in the Department of Labor and Industry
''as an affirmative policy of this State . . .procedures which will
enable women to contribute to society according to their fullest
possible potential.' 1 62 In the years since passage of this policy, the

legislature has enacted the MMLA, the Displaced Homemaker's
Program,6 3 and most recently an "incentive program" for the provision of day care services to welfare recipients.' 6 ' If the legislature
is to maintain its demonstrated commitment to equal employment
opportunity for women, it must take the initiative again and enact
programs which make equal dignity in employment a Montana
reality.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Miller-Wohl decision stretches federal discrimination
analysis further than it has reached before in attacking a workplace structure inherently discriminatory against women. This further reach also marks the dead end of federal discrimination analysis. The Montana Constitution obliges attorneys to develop a new
discrimination analysis, eschewing status quo employment standards in favor of the gender-neutral standards of equality and dig160. MINN. STAT. § 181.941 (1987) provides in part:
Sec. 2. PARENTING LEAVE Subdivision 1. SIX-WEEK LEAVE; BIRTH OR
ADOPTION. An employer must grant an unpaid leave of absence to an employee
who has been employed by the employer for at least 12 months who is a natural or
adoptive parent in conjunction with the birth or adoption of a child. The length of
the leave shall be determined by the employee, but may not exceed six weeks,
unless agreed to by the employer.
161. At least five states now provide disability insurance to all workers. Williams,
supra note 44, at 379. In Montana where the vast majority of employers are small businesses, state programs can equitably spread the cost of programs necessary to achieve equal
employment opportunity.
162. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-7-101 (1987) (enacted 1973).
163. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-7-301 to -310 (1987) (enacted 1983).

164.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§§ 39-7-601 to -606 (1987) (enacted 1987).
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nity. This comment has suggested only an outline for that new
analysis. Montana lawyers have the opportunity to develop that
analysis in their sex discrimination cases. If they seize this opportunity, Montana lawyers may not only prevail in new kinds of
cases, but they may also point out a new direction for national discrimination sex analysis.
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